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Industrial Voluntarism in Canada
Sean Tucker and Alex Mucalov
The term “industrial voluntarism” has been used to describe the norm that 
dominated union organizing and, more broadly, union-management relations 
in Canada during most of the first half of the 20th century. in practical terms, 
the principle defines situations in which unions and employers initiate, develop, 
and enforce agreements without state assistance or compulsion. This paper 
investigates the history of voluntarism in Canada with attention to post-war 
legal accommodations and various manifestations of voluntarism related 
to union recognition. We show how aspects of the Framework of Fairness 
agreement (FFa) negotiated between magna international and the Canadian 
auto Workers (CaW) in 2007 is informed by industrial voluntarism. The FFa 
facilitates voluntary recognition of CaW locals at magna plants in exchange for 
a no-strike promise and acceptance of many features of magna’s existing human 
resource management system. overall, the historical and contemporary evidence 
show that voluntarism continues to manifest in different forms in response to 
changing labour relations conditions. 
KeyWorDs: union recognition, industrial relations history, framework of fairness 
agreement
Just as the best settlement of a dispute is a voluntary settlement, so the 
best way for employees and employers to settle differences of their working 
together is by an agreement voluntarily arrived at.
Industrial Canada (1943: 124)
On October 17, 2007, Buzz Hargrove, President of the Canadian Auto Workers 
(CAW), and Frank Stronach, Chairman of Magna International, stunned labour and 
business groups when they announced a comprehensive labour relations agreement 
called the “Framework of Fairness Agreement” (FFA). Long-time adversaries, Hargrove 
and Stronach claimed that there were “a surprising number of issues on which we 
now see eye to eye” (Stronach and Hargrove, 2007: A21). Observers labeled the 
deal historic given the potential implications it could have for union-management 
relations in Canada (Armstrong, 2007). The primary feature of the FFA is a Magna-
sponsored process that allows 18,000 non-unionized Magna workers in Canada to 
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decide whether they want to be represented by the CAW. In cases where a majority of 
a plant’s workers support unionization by a secret ballot vote, Magna will voluntarily 
recognize the CAW as exclusive bargaining agent at that plant.1 
This paper will show how elements of the FFA are a manifestation of the historically 
significant, and often overlooked, principle of industrial voluntarism—the principle 
that the contours of union-employer relations ought to be a product of voluntary 
agreement between the principal parties (i.e., union and employer) without state 
intervention. We trace the historical development of industrial voluntarism in Canada 
between approximately 1900 and today, using the FFA as a contemporary example. 
Prior to the adoption of legislation to establish labour relations boards which 
regulated union organizing, collective bargaining, and dispute resolution, industrial 
voluntarism flourished in Canada (Fudge and Tucker, 2001). Voluntarism’s hallmark was 
voluntary contracting between unions and employers. Consistent with this practice, 
the state adopted a non-interventionist stance; furthermore, in this environment, 
employers often successfully resisted union demands for formal recognition. However, 
the balance of power shifted dramatically with the passage of federal and provincial 
labour laws in the mid-1940’s; henceforth, governments assumed an active role in 
industrial relations through labour relations boards which could compel employers to 
recognize and collectively bargain with unions supported by the majority of workers. 
Under this new regime, it seemed that voluntarism no longer served a purpose. Indeed, 
at times some scholars even claimed that it was defunct (e.g., Fink, 1973). However, 
evidence indicates that voluntarism waned but never vanished, and is still relevant. At 
present, the principle of voluntarism informs neutrality agreements, voluntary union 
recognition, and other non-statutory approaches. 
The paper is organized into four parts: Part one defines industrial voluntarism and 
examines its practical significance in the context of union organizing between 1900 
and 1944. Part two shows how voluntarism was accommodated in post-war labour 
laws. Part three examines various employer and union actions to contract outside of 
Canadian labour law and how the logic of voluntarism informs such agreements. 
Finally, part four uses the recent Magna-CAW agreement as a case study to examine 
similarities and differences between historical and contemporary manifestations 
of industrial voluntarism. Deals like the FFA indicate the continued relevance of 
voluntarism as an organizing logic.
Industrial Voluntarism Defined
The term “industrial voluntarism” has been used to describe the norm that dominated 
union organizing and, more broadly, union-management relations in Canada during 
most of the first half of the 20th century (Fudge and Tucker, 2001). In practical terms, 
the principle of industrial voluntarism defines situations in which unions and employers 
initiate, develop, and enforce agreements without state assistance or compulsion 
(Flanders, 1970; Hawkins, 1971). 
Industrial voluntarism was first used to describe industrial relations in early twentieth 
century Britain (Flanders, 1974; White, 1978). In the early American experience and 
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tradition of American Federation of Labor leader Samuel Gompers, the term has been 
described this way:
“Voluntarism” is […] the philosophy said to characterize American unionism prior to the New Deal 
era under which the labor movement committed itself to work within the laissez-faire capitalist 
economy, relying on its economic power to protect and promote the interests of workers and 
rejecting government aid and intervention (Fink, 1973: 805). 
Unfortunately contemporary usage of industrial voluntarism in scholarship is not 
always consistent (Thompson, 1986; England, 1986). For instance, England (1986) 
noted that the following definition of voluntarism has currency in some circles even 
though it seems at direct odds with traditional meanings:
[Laws] which protect union organization, enforce collective agreements, control timeliness 
of economic sanctions, and establish the procedures under which bargaining takes place have 
traditionally been regarded as consistent with voluntarism because, it is believed, their thrust is 
procedural rather than substantive (264).
However, England (1986) rejected that this defines voluntarism because, as he 
argued, it is impossible to distinguish between “permissible procedural intervention,” 
which is assumed in the quote above and assumed to enable voluntarism, and 
“impermissible substantive intervention,” which undercuts voluntarism (270). More 
recently, Slinn (2008) noted that the “relatively interventionist reality of our labour 
relations system and the widely-held understanding that it is, at least apart from 
procedure, a voluntary system” (725) makes the concept difficult to define. Others 
have treated state-sponsored industrial relations systems and the norm of voluntarism 
as competing paradigms which gain advantage under particular circumstances 
(Brudney, 2005). 
In this paper, we do not define voluntarism as a binary concept—that is, that it is 
either strictly present or strictly absent. Rather, based on the evidence marshaled here, 
we propose that industrial voluntarism has varied in potency over time. Further, we 
assume that aspects of the contemporary industrial relations systems in Canada reflect 
voluntarism more so than others. For example, collective bargaining negotiations 
seldom require substantive state intervention (e.g., first contact arbitration) and are 
more or less conducted on a voluntary basis. In other domains however voluntarism 
seems especially weak, particularly in relation to union organizing (Slinn, 2008) 
where labour board imposed remedies for employers’ unfair labour practices are 
relatively more common than interventions in collective bargaining. Our analysis is 
primarily concerned with voluntarism in the context of union recognition from 1900 
to present. 
Industrial Voluntarism (1900-1944)
Prospects for Canadian workers wishing to unionize during the early 20th century 
were generally bleak due to strong employer resistance to organizing and collective 
bargaining. For their part, many employers refused to recognize a union formally 
unless workers demonstrated their collective strength by striking for recognition; even 
in these cases, recognition was not a guaranteed result. Furthermore, in the early 20th 
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century, governments were unwilling to compel employers to recognize unions with 
majority support. Politicians would let power relations between unions and employers 
determine the outcome of organizing campaigns, and here, the preponderance of 
management’s power militated against union organization. Self-regulated industrial 
relations were supported by judicial interpretations of common law which severely 
constrained union organizing activity (Fudge and Tucker, 2001). Other factors that 
negatively affected union activities included anti-union employer tactics: blacklisting 
suspected union supporters, dismissing employees, using detectives to spy on union 
members, and employing strike-breakers (Manley, 1986). All of these activities were 
ironic features of early twentieth-century industrial voluntarism, which supposed that 
employers and workers alike were free to choose. 
Voluntarism was an ideal consistent with liberal democracies (Glasbeek, 1986). 
However, while historically voluntarism meant that unions were “free” to contract 
wages and employment matters on behalf of their members, union recognition, a 
necessary precursor to collective bargaining, was left to the discretion of employers. 
In 1903, the President of the influential Canadian Manufacturing Association (CMA) 
succinctly and forcefully articulated how its members interpreted the central role 
of voluntarism amid growing union organizing activity: “The employer of Canada 
must [never forfeit the freedom] to purchase without interference such labor as he 
requires” (quoted in Craven, 1980: 125). 
Notwithstanding turn of the twentieth-century statutes, such as the Conciliation 
Act of 1900 and Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA) of 1907, which set 
out procedures for state conciliation of strikes and lockouts, as well as periodic 
statements of industrial relations’ principles and goals, most politicians took a 
laissez-faire attitude towards matters of industrial relations.2 These circumstances 
meant industrial voluntarism flourished. Boards of investigation appointed under the 
IDIA and legislation that mandated state-sponsored conciliation before a strike or 
lockout were limited to issuing non-binding reports to disputants. At most, unions 
were afforded temporary recognition during a work stoppage (under the IDIA). In 
response to industrial unrest that threatened the public interest, Mackenzie King, 
author of the IDIA, took an active role in personally mediating strikes. Consistent 
with the spirit of voluntarism, he believed that state-appointed conciliators should act 
as ‘impartial umpires’ during disputes, favourable to neither unions nor employers. 
In practice, however, King himself showed bias towards employer interests in some 
situations, and compromise was his preferred approach to ending strikes (Fudge and 
Tucker, 2001; Craven, 1980). In this legal vacuum, many employers were able to 
resist demands for union recognition even when faced with strong worker support 
for collective bargaining.
Craven (1980) noted that King may have believed “that unions which deserved 
recognition would get it because they would convince management of their 
reasonableness and indispensability [to] a good working relationship” (235). 
Hence, voluntarism was most likely to succeed where unions were ‘reasonable’ in 
their demands and respected the law, and in situations which involved enlightened 
employers who were willing to negotiate. 
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There is evidence that some employers accepted union recognition, and that stable 
collective bargaining relations developed. This was especially true for railway workers, 
longshoremen, and other craft workers who occupied strategic or “respectable” 
positions in industry, such as, typographical workers and locomotive engineers (Fudge 
and Tucker, 2001). Railway companies, for example, sought stability in their operations 
and thus tried to establish solid collective bargaining relationships at the outset with 
independent (non-company dominated) unions. More generally, employers were 
more inclined to grant union recognition when the union and its leadership were 
conservative, responsible, free of “foreign agitators,” and averse to strike activity 
(Craven, 1980).3
Sam Herbst, organizer for the International Ladies Garment Workers Union 
(ILGWU), was one such union leader who embraced the norms of industrial 
voluntarism to achieve gains for members. During the late 1930s, Herbst negotiated 
union recognition contracts with all of Winnipeg’s garment manufacturers by 
promising (and delivering) an end to intense price cutting and industrial instability. 
Herbst’s top-down autocratic brand of organizing, which riled some of his fellow 
union leaders, involved first signing labour agreements with manufacturers and, later, 
having workers join the ILGWU (Smith, 1985; Gray, 1966). 
For the most part, voluntarism continued to be the dominant form of labour 
relations in Canada until the mid-1940s. During the Second World War, the federal 
government assumed jurisdiction for labour relations in most industrial sectors. Strike 
activity soared, with employers’ refusals to recognize unions a leading cause of non-
wage related strikes.4 Voluntarism was so deeply entrenched in Canada that even 
when Prime Minister King faced intense political pressure to change course in the 
early 1940s, his government responded only by issuing non-binding labour relations 
principles—and even to these irresolute guidelines his ministers would not adhere 
(Fudge and Tucker, 2001). 
Industrial Voluntarism (Post-War Era)
With strike activity at historic record levels in 1944, King gave into pressure for US 
Wagner-like legislation and introduced wartime order-in-council PC 1003. The pream-
ble of this historically significant piece of Canadian legislation declared unequivocally 
that voluntarism alone was no longer sufficient to govern labour relations. It stated 
that “both employers and employees should be free to organize for the conduct of 
negotiations between them and that a procedure should be established for such 
negotiations” (emphasis added; Labour Gazette, 1944: 136-137). The “procedure” 
mentioned in the legislation not only guaranteed workers the right to organize collec-
tively, but also compelled employers to recognize bona fide unions, offered workers 
state protection against employers’ unfair labour practices, and made collective bar-
gaining compulsory (McInnis, 2002). Although the federal government was not the 
first Canadian government to adopt labour law reforms (British Columbia, Ontario, 
and Saskatchewan passed similar laws in 1943), its action had the most immediate 
impact on labour organizing activity because federal control of industry during the 
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war was extensive. Pursuant to the passage of the legislation, recognition strikes 
dropped to two percent of all strikes between 1944 and 1946 (Labour Gazette, 1945 
and 1947).
Interestingly, voluntarism was accommodated in wartime labour laws despite 
explicit language to the contrary in these laws’ preambles. In effect, the new federal 
and provincial laws offered dual procedures for union recognition. An important 
provision of PC 1003 stated that upon an application from a union, “the [Labour] 
Board shall by an examination of records, by a vote or otherwise, satisfy itself 
that an election or appointment of bargaining representatives was regularly and 
properly made” (emphasis added; Labour Gazette, 1944: 8). This clause effectively 
accommodated voluntary union recognition schemes without a formal representation 
vote monitored by a labour board. This situation was similar to that in the US, where, 
since 1935, elections supervised by the National Labour Relation Board have not 
been a prerequisite for union recognition (Brudney, 2005). Fudge and Tucker (2001) 
conclude that while passage of new labour legislation “marked a rupture from the 
individualism of the common law and the absolutism of property rights,” […] “instead 
of replacing the regimes of liberal and industrial voluntarism, industrial pluralism was 
grafted onto them” (302 and 306).
Labour laws in Ontario and some other provinces were circumspect on the 
contracting-out of union recognition to industrial relations parties. However, legislation 
in other provinces was not so chary of voluntarism; for instance, voluntarism was 
explicitly condoned in Quebec’s Labour Relations Act (1944). The Quebec law allowed 
“unrecognized associations” to enter into collective agreements; however, “an 
agreement so entered into shall become void the day another association is recognized 
by the Board” (Labour Gazette, 1944: 38). Thus, in Quebec, while voluntarism was 
accommodated, contracting outside of the law was accorded a lower status than 
state-sanctioned processes.
Two factors explain why voluntarism was accommodated in wartime labour 
laws. First, the allowance of voluntarism likely appeased employer concerns 
about statutory coercion at little cost. Not surprisingly, during the war, employer 
groups, such as the influential Canadian Manufacturing Association, declared that 
“compulsion [in industrial relations is] neither desirable nor necessary” (National 
War Labour Board (NWLB), 1943: 160). In terms of collective bargaining, one 
employer reasoned that “the word “compulsory” and the word “bargain” cannot 
be joined together since the word “bargain” means the right of each to bargain 
with the other freely and without compulsion. The moment compulsion steps in, 
bargaining ceases to exist” (NWLB, 1943: 1185). Thus, offering dual methods for 
union recognition—one explicit and one implicit—may have been a measure of 
compromise for employers. 
Second, it is possible that Canadian law-makers sought to encourage the 
development of a more orderly and balanced form of industrial voluntarism that 
established clear procedural boundaries which in the long term would ultimately 
necessitate less government intervention (Doorey, 2007; Fudge and Tucker, 2001; 
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Glasbeek, 1986). Whatever the reason why voluntarism was accommodated in post-
war Canadian labour law, the vast majority of unions, having been treated unfairly 
by employers and with indifference by governments, abandoned the principle for 
institutional measures of protection. Thus, union commitment to state-sponsored 
recognition systems—both the card check and mandatory votes—remained strong in 
Canada in subsequent decades.5 
The arrival of meaningful state participation in industrial relations led many in 
the field to assume that the norm of voluntarism became extinct. In support of this 
view, Fudge and Tucker noted the following: “By 1950, the ideology and practice 
of industrial pluralism [i.e., participation by unions, employers, and the state] had 
become hegemonic; everything that had come before it was treated as pre-history, 
hardly worthy of attention” (2001: 302). Writing in the mid-1980s, a distinguished 
group of Canadian industrial relations scholars wrote a series of articles related to 
the question of the “death of voluntarism” in industrial relations (England, 1986). 
Indeed, in terms of union recognition, post-war labour laws provided capital and 
labour with the institutional mechanisms adequate to support the formation of 
unions. However, as Doorey has noted, the “scheme of voluntary [union] recognition 
[…] remained in place, waiting patiently in the wings to be exploited by the industrial 
relations actors” (2005: 22). 
The Resilience of Voluntarism: Voluntary Recognition, 
neutrality agreements, and other non-Statutory 
Procedures 
Voluntarism has manifested in several ways in the post-war period. Here we describe 
neutrality agreements, voluntary recognition schemes, and other non-statutory de-
velopments. We observed differences not only in the nature and scope of these con-
tracts, but also in the number of actors involved. Generally, industrial voluntarism is 
embodied in relations between one union and one employer. However, it has also 
been demonstrated in labour-management relations at the sector level, and in rare 
cases, at a provincial level as it did in British Columbia in the late-1980s. We turn to 
this historically significant example first.
In 1987, the Premier of BC, Bill Vander Zalm, adopted sweeping reforms to the 
province’s labour law. Known as Bill 19, the Industrial Relations Reform Act renamed 
the Labour Relations Board the Industrial Relations Council (IRC) and granted it 
considerable power to intervene in labour relations. For instance, the IRC could 
designate private sector workers as essential in the event of a strike, allow employers 
to openly engage in electioneering during organizing campaigns, restrict successorship 
rights, and limit picketing, to name a few features of the controversial legislation 
(see Leslie, 1991; Goldberg-Hiller, 1996). The BC Federation of Labour (BCFed) and 
other unions organized a boycott of the IRC. The central challenge of the boycott 
was to develop a long term strategy that demonstrated that “legality and order [in 
industrial relations] could remain consonant in the context of illegality and resistance” 
(Goldberg-Hiller, 1996: 330). 
222 relations industrielles / industrial relations – 65-2, 2010 
To meet this challenge, BCFed affiliated and some non-affiliated unions devised a 
parallel system that guaranteed continuation of stable industrial relations. Although 
the boycott was never total while it was in force between 1987 and 1992 (e.g., the IRC 
was used by some unions for certification applications and for certain exemptions), 
voluntarism played a central role in the functioning of the counter administration. 
Instead of using the IRC, affiliated unions relied on independent mediators, arbitrators, 
and lawyers to monitor certification and strike votes, and to assist in resolving disputes 
with employers. Further, private negotiations between employers and unions occurred 
more often under this regime. 
An “exemption committee” comprised of union officers affiliated with the BCFed 
was established to hear special requests to use the IRC’s administrative services. As 
Goldberg-Hiller (1996) noted: “For the boycott to remain strong, the boycott code, 
produced within the exemption committee, had to effectively regulate industrial 
relations, usurping the role of the competing labour code and labour relations board” 
(342-343). He identified several cases for which an exemption committee decision 
to allow access to the IRC was successfully used as leverage to resolve disputes 
with employers before actually resorting to the IRC. For example, this order from 
a committee’s decision regarding a bargaining unit dispute illustrates the role of 
voluntarism in the effective functioning of the temporary industrial relations system. 
Ask your counsel to attempt to get the employer to agree to an independent arbitrator to hear 
the case and render a binding decision based on previous Labour Relations Board jurisprudence. 
If this measure fails, the panel has granted an exemption to appear before the IRC pursuant to 
this matter” (Boycott Exemption Files, BCFed Offices, Burnaby, BC, cited in Goldbert-Hiller, 1996: 
346, fn. 89). 
Goldberg-Hiller (1996) notes that strike activity remained low during the boycott, 
which coupled with the overall approach to industrial relations “effectively legitimated 
the boycott in the eyes of business” (347). While voluntarism proved to be an effective 
stopgap measure during the boycott, some local unions bore significant financial 
costs associated with using the rival system. Delays for arbitrators were commonplace 
and fees for arbitrators, mediators and lawyers were a burden, especially for smaller 
unions. The voluntary system of industrial relations was sustained until 1992 when a 
more balanced labour code was introduced by Premier Mike Hartcourt. 
In the vast majority of cases in which non-statutory voluntarism has emerged in the 
post-war period, it has been far less elaborate and far-reaching than the experience 
in BC. The most common manifestation is voluntary recognition agreements between 
an employer and union. In their simplest form these agreements describe the 
bargaining unit and the fact that an employer agrees to recognize a union without 
any preconditions. Historically, this has been used in the construction industry when 
non-union contractors wish to work on a project (Carrothers, 1968). In the retail 
food industry, Loblaws, owner of Superstore and other grocery stores, has voluntarily 
recognized workers prior to opening new stores (e.g., ALRB, 1992). In these scenarios, 
evidence of majority support for a union is required, and often the card check method 
or private vote is used. 
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More recently voluntarism in Canada has manifested in neutrality agreements, which 
Doorey defines as “privately bargained contracts between unions and employers that 
define a set of rules by which union organizing campaigns and voluntary recognition 
will take place” (2007: 42-43). To form these agreements, a union or employer 
approaches the other party to negotiate terms; or, alternatively, an established union 
may instigate neutrality agreement negotiations for a non-unionized subsidiary as part 
of wider collective bargaining with the unionized parent company. For instance, during 
collective bargaining with DaimlerChrysler in 2000, the Canadian Auto Workers Union 
(CAW) negotiated a neutrality agreement for organizing Freightliner, a non-union 
Daimler subsidiary. Such agreements also require employers to remain neutral during 
organizing campaigns (Brudney, 2005; Eaton and Krieksy, 2001). Most salient is that the 
state usually has no direct role in regulating the union certification process. 
An example involves the United Steel Workers which recently negotiated a 
wide-ranging agreement with ArcelorMittal, the parent company of long-time non-
union steelmaker Dofasco. The deal negotiated in 2007 outlined a process whereby 
Steelworker representatives would be given access to the Dofasco shop floor to 
gauge worker support for unionization. If employee support was present, the next 
step involved electing workers to a bargaining committee and conducting contract 
negotiations with Dofasco. If a tentative collective agreement was reached, workers 
would then have an opportunity to vote on the agreement and, implicitly, union 
representation. Ultimately these provisions were not enacted because the USW found 
insufficient support for unionization among Dofasco workers (USW, 2008). 
Neutrality agreements surfaced in the US in the late 1970s (Brudney, 2005). Their 
proliferation was due in large part to unions’ dissatisfaction with the National Labour 
Relations Board’s (NLRB) union recognition procedure, which employers’ legal action 
can seriously protract. Delays in the formal certification process, increasing use of 
anti-union tactics by employers, “right to work” legislation, and other such factors 
resulted in a sharp decline in union density (Eaton and Krieksy, 2001). This led to 
experimentation with other approaches to revitalizing the union movement (Eaton 
and Krieksy, 2006; Rose and Chaison, 2001). Accordingly, neutrality agreements 
premised on voluntary contracting are now accepted by some unions as a strategic 
option for union renewal. However, some US employers have challenged the legality 
of such agreements (Cohen, Santucci and Fritts, 2006).
Neutrality agreements have been adopted in Canada since the 1980s for similar 
reasons. First, in some Canadian jurisdictions, union organizing has become more 
difficult since the adoption of secret ballot elections in place of the card certification 
method (Martinello, 2000) and election delays (Campolieti, Riddell and Slinn, 2007). 
These changes have increased the potential for employer interference in organizing 
campaigns, which has been shown to lower union certification rates (Bentham, 2002; 
Johnson, 2004), especially in the private sector, where density has sharply declined in 
the past three decades (Godard, 2003). 
Doorey (2007) argues that contemporary labour law has played a subtle yet critically 
important role in legally validating the above mentioned non-statutory approaches.6 
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To test this claim, we searched provincial and federal labour codes for provisions 
explicitly related to voluntary union recognition agreements. In some jurisdictions, 
legislation is silent on voluntary union recognition (Federal, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia). In these jurisdictions, 
however, labour board decisions accept voluntary recognition agreements. For 
example, in a recent decision, the BC Labour Relations Board (BCLRB) stated that 
voluntary union recognition schemes “are widely used and accepted in labour relations 
in BC and are consistent with Code principles” (BCLRB, 2008: 4). An earlier landmark 
BCLRB decision makes clear the Board’s jurisdiction: “Voluntary recognition originates 
outside of the Board’s jurisdiction. It is born out of the parties’ agreement as opposed 
to statutory compulsion” (Delta Hospital, BCLRB No. 76/77, [1978]: 367).
As artifacts of the pre-WWII industrial voluntarism, statutory provisions related 
to voluntary recognition appear in several jurisdictions (Prince Edward Island, Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Alberta). Across these provinces, though, there 
is variation both in the degrees to which the law recognizes voluntary agreements 
and to which voluntarism is advertised as an alternative to statutory processes. 
For example, in Ontario in 1993, the New Democratic government engendered 
conditions that were more favourable for the negotiation of neutrality agreements 
when it amended the Ontario Labour Relations Act so that voluntarily recognized 
unions could legally strike and access state-sponsored conciliation (Doorey, 2007). 
The Alberta Labour Relations Board (ALRB), which publishes detailed information 
about the potential benefits and costs of voluntary recognition, notes that one of 
the main advantages of voluntary recognition schemes is that such pacts can create 
a “spirit of cooperation” between employers and unions (ALRB, 2003). Moreover, 
the landmark BCLRB decision compared voluntary union recognition agreements to 
statutory certification this way: 
The principal advantage of [statutory compulsion] is that it is an orderly, statutory process and one 
which is overseen or monitored by an independent tribunal having the responsibility to protect 
the legitimate interest of employers, trade unions, and employees. The most commonly noted 
advantages to recognition by agreement are that the parties have come together initially on 
amicable terms rather than as adversaries; that the parameters of the bargaining relationship are 
determined by the parties themselves rather than by some external agency which may or may not 
fully understand the intricacies of their work situation; and that expense and delay are avoided. 
(Delta Hospital, BCLRB No. 76/77, [1978] 367 and 371)
The language used in the BCLRB decision and in the ALRB guide is strikingly 
reminiscent of the spirit of pre-PC 1003 era language, when employers and the state 
equated ‘reasonable’ unionism with cooperation and shared interests, and ultimately, 
voluntary contracting. While these examples are not concrete evidence that all 
Canadian governments deliberately use “legal norms, procedures, and sanctions to 
‘frame’ or ‘steer’ the process of self-regulation” (Barnard, Deakin and Hobbs, 2005: 
4) in industrial relations, the evidence does suggest, at a minimum, that voluntarism 
has been accommodated and given legal status. In Ontario and Alberta, voluntary 
recognition is overtly presented as an alternative to statutory mechanisms. In the next 
section, we focus on the recent neutrality agreement between Magna International 
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and the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), known as the Framework of Fairness 
Agreement (FFA). Further, we use this case to compare contemporary and historical 
manifestations of voluntarism. 
a Case Study of Voluntarism: The Magna-CaW FFa
Within this legal context, Frank Stronach, founder of Magna International, and Buzz 
Hargrove, then President of the CAW, negotiated the FFA. Announced in October 
2007, the wide-ranging deal brought an end to years of sometimes bitter conflict be-
tween Magna and the CAW. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the US-based United 
Auto Workers (UAW) (the predecessor to the CAW), attempted to unionize workers 
at Magna’s Canadian plants, but with little success. In 1999, the CAW made limited 
inroads when it managed to organize workers at the Magna-controlled Integram 
Seating plant, and, subsequently, two additional Magna plants. It also negotiated a 
“neutrality letter” with The Big Three, a key part of which stated that Magna workers 
should “decide whether or not to join a union in an atmosphere free of intimidation, 
interference or risk of reprisal” (Keenan, 1999: B9). But, despite significant invest-
ments by the CAW/UAW in organizing Magna workers, little further was achieved.
Magna has successfully staved off traditional union organizing attempts because 
of its corporate culture, human resource management system, and subtle resistance 
to unions. The Magna “Employee Charter,” a social contract established by Stronach, 
guarantees workers “a safe and healthful workplace,” “fair treatment,” “competitive 
wages,” and “employee profit participation” (Magna, 2008)—many of the provisions 
workers might look to a union to provide through collective bargaining (Lewchuk 
and Wells, 2007a). In addition, an “Open Door Policy” and a corporate telephone 
Hotline allow employees to voice workplace concerns. In the minds of some workers, 
these protections, and compensation on a par with that of workers at unionized auto 
plants, may obviate the need for a union. Lewchuk and Wells (2007a), though, found 
evidence that this view is not universally shared, especially among Magna workers 
who fear repercussions for speaking up about work-related problems. Other evidence 
suggests that, in the past, some Magna managers deliberately tried to undermine 
CAW organizing campaigns (Lewchuk and Wells, 2007b). 
In September 2005, Stronach initiated informal negotiations with Hargrove to 
develop a new labour relations system, one that would be based on co-operation 
rather than conflict. Following two years of private talks, Stronach and Hargrove 
announced the FFA.7 Publicly, the two men stated that they entered the agreement 
for the sake of the competitive position of the Canadian auto manufacturing industry, 
which faces increasingly cut-throat global competition (Stronach and Hargrove, 2007). 
In the spirit of co-determination, Stronach and Hargrove jointly authored an editorial 
published in the Globe and Mail:
Magna accepts the CAW as a genuine partner, with a crucial role to safeguard the interests of 
Magna’s workers as the company grows and changes. And the CAW accepts Magna’s culture of 
‘fair enterprise,’ and the unique structures we’ve put in place over the years to make decisions and 
resolve concerns with maximum worker participation (Stronach and Hargrove, 2007: A21).
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The motivation for the deal is undoubtedly strategic, and both Hargrove and 
Stronach believe that the FFA can help them achieve disparate objectives. For Hargrove, 
the most pressing challenge is to maintain (and potentially increase) private sector 
union density in Canada, which has declined in the last decade.8 There is grave concern 
that union density in Canada may follow the US experience, where public and private 
unionization has sharply declined since 1980 (Kumar and Schenk, 2006). In the Cana-
dian auto sector, the decline in unionization has been pronounced over the past two 
decades as General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford have lost market share and shifted from 
vertically-integrated auto manufacturing to automobile assembly with components 
produced by non-unionized subcontractors. At the same time, auto manufacturers 
Toyota and Honda have avoided unionization by using human resource management 
practices which share some similarities with Magna’s employee relations system.
For Stronach, too, concluding the FFA was a matter of strategy. In many 
ways, Stronach’s motivations are more intriguing, especially since he initiated the 
negotiations leading to the FFA. The deal represented an end to industrial instability 
caused by untimely union organizing, legal battles, and potential labour unrest. 
By organizing with the CAW, Magna’s founder was also able to select the union 
he wanted and keep out potentially more militant rivals that might emerge in the 
future.9 More importantly, by organizing voluntarily, Stronach may have been able to 
negotiate for more favourable terms than could be reasonably expected in publicly-
followed collective bargaining with the CAW (Van Praet, 2007). Finally, and in a 
related vein, the FFA preserves Magna’s human resource management system now 
and will continue to do so when Stronach relinquishes control of the company. Since 
Magna uses an innovative employee relations system and, at the time of the FFA 
negotiations, provided similar wages and benefits offered by unionized competitors 
(Lewchuk and Wells, 2007a), unionizing under terms set out by the FFA it may have 
been assumed that Magna would not incur significant financial costs. These reasons 
align closely with Eaton and Kriesky’s (2006) findings about employers’ motivations 
for negotiating neutrality agreements. 
Such ostensibly radical concessions on the parts of both Hargrove and Stronach 
were sure to draw sharp reviews, both negative and positive. Opposition to the FFA 
centres on several key provisions, but has not questioned the principle of contracting 
outside statutory processes. A controversial provision of the FFA states that impasses 
in collective bargaining will go to binding arbitration instead of a strike or lockout. Ed 
Broadbent decried this no-strike clause, stating that “workplace democracy becomes 
a sham when unions lose their only instruments of power, the right to withdraw 
their labour and the right to select, without management approval, their workplace 
representatives” (2007: A25). The FFA also stipulates that there will be no union 
stewards in Magna plants; instead, “employee advocates” will be chosen by union 
members and management. On these points, some have called the deal a sell-out to 
independent unionism and have warned that it would likely set a precedent which 
could negatively affect the interests of unionized and non-unionized workers alike 
(Gindin, 2007).10 Despite these charges the FFA was approved at the CAW annual 
meeting in December 2007.
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In contrast, proponents of the FFA see the pact as an opportunity to improve Magna’s 
competitive position, and by extension, the conditions for workers (Armstrong, 2007). 
Furthermore, greater co-operation between the CAW and Magna may improve their 
ability to lobby governments to re-negotiate global trade agreements (Armstrong, 
2007). On the criticism regarding the union’s concession of the fundamental right to 
strike, supporters of the FFA argue that Magna workers can vote no to the agreement, 
and so retain this right (CAW, 2007). More recently, Hargrove publicly stated that the 
FFA “could be a model for other non-union operations like Honda, Toyota and Dofasco 
if they would be willing to invite [the CAW] in and have a neutrality agreement that 
says they welcome the union and workers would make the decision” (Van Alphen, 
2007: B5).11
Comparing Historical and Contemporary Manifestations  
of Voluntarism
The most obvious similarity between the voluntarism today and that of yesterday is 
that contemporary voluntarism represents a form of private contracting for union 
recognition, which was the norm in the early 20th century. Mackenzie King, who 
for decades refused to support legislation guaranteeing workers compulsory union 
recognition, would likely approve of today’s modest experiments with self-regulated 
industrial relations. 
However, the circumstances that gave rise to neutrality agreements and other 
non-statutory mechanisms reveal important differences between contemporary and 
historical voluntarism. At present, Canadian unions have a choice between, on the 
one hand, initiating negotiations with employers, or, on the other hand, attempting 
to gain recognition through state-sponsored certification procedures. The boycott of 
the IRC in BC is interesting in that the leadership of the BCFed openly declared that 
areas of the boycotted legislation “that may prove to be of benefit to unions will be 
used” (Goldberg-Hiller, 1996: 337). In the case of the CAW, it certainly benefited 
from having an alternative in the Ontario labour board’s certification process. It is 
unlikely that Magna would have agreed to the FFA in the absence of a real threat 
of continued organizing. One of the appeals of voluntarism may be the potential 
reductions in legal expenses associated with employer attempts to resist unionization. 
Hargrove (2009) noted that if unions and employers can avoid forming an adversarial 
relationship “then naturally [they] start out with a more mature relationship and that 
will even improve over the years.”
Related to this, the ability of the state to enforce voluntary recognition agreements 
is greater now than in the past; the legal standing of voluntary union recognition 
agreements does, however, vary across jurisdictions. According to Doorey (2007, 2009), 
in Ontario, successful voluntary recognition has the same “practical effect” (2007: 92) 
as the formal Board certification system; however, Section 66 of the OLRA stipulates 
that any time during the year after a voluntary recognition agreement was signed, an 
employee or other union member representing an employee in the bargaining unit 
may apply to the Board to have it declare that the union is not entitled to represent the 
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bargaining unit. Similarly, in Manitoba and Alberta, voluntary recognition agreements 
do not enjoy the “same rights and privileges in law” (Manitoba Labour Board, 2006: 
19). The Alberta Labour Relations Code provides unions with less legal protection 
because either a union or employer can sever recognition with six months notice 
before the expiry of a collective agreement. 
Overall, contemporary labour codes provide significantly more protection than 
was afforded to unions in the early 20th century model of self-regulated industrial 
relations. It is still too early to tell whether the dual process for union recognition acts 
to rebalance power to enable voluntarism to be something more than a fig leaf for 
managerial power. Further, in the case of the FFA, it is unclear what direct role Ontario 
labour law had in shaping the deal.12 
Recent manifestations of voluntarism have shown a remarkable ability to work 
within the contours of the law. Historically, the legal vacuum that existed with respect 
to labour law meant that employers and unions could fashion agreements which 
today would be illegal (e.g., formation of company unions). Looking ahead, union-
and-employer-driven voluntarism may be opposed if non-unionized workers do not 
have meaningful opportunities to shape and, if desired, reject such deals. As the ALRB 
stated: “Voluntary recognition is not a way of circumventing the employees’ freedom 
to choose union representation, but of facilitating that choice (24).” 
Lastly, and importantly, deals like the FFA cover a broad range of labour-
management issues beyond union recognition. Publicly, the CAW leadership framed 
the negotiations and concessions leading to the FFA this way:
[Like] any bargaining, negotiations over voluntary recognition involve give and take. The union 
can’t dictate the deal. And the deal will never be perfect. But if it allows the union to get its foot in 
the door, without the employer crushing us before we start, then it’s a victory (CAW, 2007: 12).
Indeed, the BCLRB’s statement regarding the potential positive relational and other 
benefits of voluntary union recognition rings especially true in the context of the FFA: 
“Parties [that] come together initially on amicable terms rather than as adversaries 
[may realize benefits because] the parameters of the bargaining relationship are 
determined by the parties themselves rather than by some external agency which 
may or may not fully understand the intricacies of their work situation.” First, the 
FFA suggests that employers can extract significant concessions as a quid pro quo for 
voluntary union recognition. Primary among these is negotiating terms of a collective 
agreement before employees have an opportunity to consent to union recognition. 
Second, and consistent with unions and employers coming together on amicable 
terms, Hargrove (2009) believes that parties “can have a mature relationship by 
starting out on a mature basis.”
Conclusion
This paper attempts to understand post-war developments in non-statutory union 
recognition in historical context. For much of the first half of the 20th century in 
Canada, politicians and employers tried and (mostly) failed to have unions accept 
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the ideology of industrial voluntarism. Having experienced the institutional model of 
union recognition in the post-war period, some unions have shown a willingness to 
appropriate strategically the practice of voluntarism. For the union movement, there 
are inherent risks in maintaining the status quo, just as there are to contracting out-
side labour laws. In contrast, it is clear why non-union employers, when faced with a 
real threat of union organizing, might prefer to negotiate, for example, a neutrality 
agreement. Not only can such deals allow them to select a preferred union, but also, 
as in the case of Magna, they can legitimate human resource management systems, 
guarantee industrial stability, and constrain the scope of collective bargaining. Over-
all, the Canadian experience indicates that the strength of voluntarism in the post-
war period is linked to the perceived efficacy of institutional certification processes 
and the compulsion employers feel to engage in such negotiations. Given the current 
economic uncertainty, most employers would probably be reluctant to enter such 
negotiations. 
notes
1 Other features of the FFA include a national collective agreement, a hybrid grievance process 
with worker self-representation in the initial steps of the process, a no strike clause, and 
mechanisms that facilitate union-management cooperation (see Magna and CAW, 2007). 
2 For example, in 1918, the federal government issued a statement of principles, among 
which was the right of workers to organize free of employer interference (Fudge and Tucker, 
2001).
3 Alternatively, Samuel Gompers and his AFL supported voluntarism because they feared that 
a state-sponsored system for collective bargaining would be inherently weak and possibly 
weaken unions if and when such a system was changed or withdrawn (Higgins, 1945: 
especially pp. 132-136). 
4 Between 1940 and 1943, recognition strikes accounted for approximately 12 percent of all 
strikes in Canada (Labour Gazette, 1940-1944).
5 The Labour Gazette did not report statistics on voluntary recognition after WWII, but such 
agreements were likely rarely made.
6 See Doorey (2009) for a detailed discussion of the legality of neutrality agreements in 
Canada. 
7 In an interview, Hargrove (2009) stated that he and Stronach met on several occasions 
to discuss the deal but also that most of the negotiations involved senior representatives 
from the CAW and Magna. Initially, Stronach tabled a proposal for a labour-management 
system based on the European works council system; however, this idea was not adopted 
in the agreement. The final contentious issue in the negotiations was the dues check off, 
specifically the percentage of dues to be deducted. 
8 Interestingly, in 2006, when discussing union renewal strategies Hargrove stated: “We 
can use both a stick and a carrot to challenge employers to remain neutral in union drives, 
or even to accept voluntary recognition in cases where a majority of employees have 
demonstrated their desire (by voting, signing cards, or other means) to join a union” 
(Hargrove, 2006: 13). 
9 In 2008, the USW attempted to organize workers at Magna’s Formet plant in St. Thomas, 
Ontario using the traditional certification process. The drive was unsuccessful with only 29% 
of workers supporting the USW in an Ontario Labour Board supervised representation vote. 
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10 See also <http://www.socialistproject.ca/caw.html> (accessed July 2009).
11 At the time this paper was written, workers at three Ontario Magna plants—in Windsor, 
London, and Mississauga—had voted in favour of implementing the FFA at their plants. 
In January 2009 Ken Lewenza, President of the CAW, said that “It has been slow and we 
expected more (plants) by now. […] We’ve been getting interest from several plants but it’s 
hard to get the leadership of the company and management on track on this in view of the 
[auto] industry falling apart.” (Van Alphen, 2009: B5). 
12 During the FFA negotiations, Magna had a lawyer present at all of the meetings attended 
by Hargrove. The former CAW President noted in an interview: “We [(i.e., the CAW)] knew 
that we had to meet the test of the Labour Relations Act; that is, once the workers ratified 
the agreement for the next year, any union has the right to come in and sign up the workers 
and take them away from us. We knew we were meeting the law—we’ve been at this a few 
years” (Hargrove, 2009). 
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RéSuMé
Le volontarisme industriel au Canada
Cet article montre comment l’Accord-cadre d’équité (ACÉ) intervenu entre Magna 
International et les Travailleurs canadiens de l’automobile (TCA) est une manifestation 
du principe présumé éteint du volontarisme industriel (ci-après VI), principe qui veut que 
les relations patronales-syndicales soient issues d’accords volontaires entre l’employeur 
et le syndicat sans l’intervention de l’État. Essentiellement le VI en tant qu’idéologie 
repose sur le postulat que l’employeur conserve le droit de propriété et la liberté de 
décider de contracter sur une base collective avec les salariés. En termes pratiques, 
un tel principe définit des situations dans lesquelles les syndicats et les employeurs 
initient, développent et mettent en œuvre des accords sans l’aide de l’État ou sans y 
être contraints par ce dernier (Flanders, 1970).
Dans notre texte nous définissons d’abord ce que nous entendons par VI et examinons 
sa portée pratique dans le contexte de l’évolution de la syndicalisation durant les années 
1900 à 1944. Puis nous montrons comment le VI a été favorisé par les législations d’après-
guerre. Nous abordons ensuite la hausse récente d’accords dit de « neutralité » au Canda 
et comment la logique du VI explique ces accords. Enfin nous utilisons l’Accord-cadre 
d’équité récemment intervenu entre Magna et les TCA pour étudier les similitudes et les 
différences entre les manifestations historiques et contemporaines du VI.
Avant l’adoption de lois instituant des conseils de relations du travail pour encadrer 
les campagnes d’organisation syndicale, la négociation collective et le règlement 
des conflits, le VI a prospéré au Canada (Fudge et Thucker, 2001). L’essence du VI est 
une entente librement établie entre syndicats et employeurs. Conséquent avec cette 
pratique, l’État a adopté au fil des ans une position non interventionniste; plus encore, 
dans un tel environnement les employeurs ont souvent réussi à s’opposer aux demandes 
de reconnaissance formelle de la part des syndicats. Mais la balance du pouvoir s’est 
déplacée de façon dramatique avec l’adoption de législations en matière du travail 
fédérale et provinciales au milieu des années 1940 : dorénavant les gouvernements 
allaient assumer un rôle actif dans les relations industrielles par le biais de conseils 
de relations du travail dont les mandats étaient de veiller à ce que les employeurs 
reconnaissent formellement les syndicats qui représentaient une majorité de salariés et 
négocient collectivement avec eux. Dans ce nouveau régime, il a pu sembler que le VI 
avait perdu sa raison d’être. Certains auteurs ont même soutenu qu’il était trépassé (ex., 
Fink, 1973). Toutefois certaines évidences indiquent que le VI n’a jamais complètement 
disparu de la scène des relations industrielles et, plus récemment, il aurait pris de 
l’ampleur. À présent le VI nous permet de comprendre certains accords de neutralité et 
des accords plus généraux comme celui entre Magna et les TCA.
Vers la fin de l’année 2007, Buzz Hargrove, président des TCA, et Frank Stronach, pdg 
de Magna International, stupéfiaient les milieux d’affaires et syndicaux par l’annonce 
de la signature d’un vaste accord de leurs relations du travail appelé « Accord-cadre 
d’équité » (ACÉ). Des observateurs ont qualifié cet accord d’entente historique étant 
donné les implications potentielles qu’il pourrait avoir sur les relations patronales-
syndicales au Canada (Armstrong, 2007).
Un premier élément du contenu de l’ACÉ consistait en l’instauration d’un processus 
appuyé par la compagnie permettant aux 18 000 salariés non syndiqués qu’elle compte 
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au Canada dans ses divers établissements de décider s’ils veulent être représentés par les 
TCA. Dans le cas où une majorité des salariés d’un établissement s’exprimerait en faveur 
de la syndicalisation lors d’un vote à scrutin secret, Magna s’engageait à reconnaître 
le syndicat des TCA comme agent négociateur exclusif pour cet établissement. Cette 
caractéristique et d’autres de l’ACÉ équivaut à sous-traiter le droit du travail de telle 
sorte que l’État n’est pas impliqué dans la mise en œuvre de l’ACÉ.
Une comparaison de l’ACÉ et d’ententes de reconnaissance volontaire du syndicat 
apparues durant la période d’après-guerre révèle des similitudes et des différences. 
La plus grande ressemblance est que ces ententes contemporaines de « neutralité » 
représentent une forme de contrat privé de reconnaissance syndicale qui était la norme 
au début du 20e siècle. Toutefois les circonstances qui ont donné naissance à de telles 
ententes contemporaines révèlent d’importantes différences d’avec le volontarisme 
antérieur. Aujourd’hui les syndicats canadiens ont le choix entre initier des ententes 
de neutralité avec les employeurs ou bien essayer d’obtenir la reconnaissance syndicale 
via les procédures d’accréditation encadrée par l’État. De plus la capacité de l’État de 
faire appliquer de telles ententes de reconnaissance volontaire est plus grande que par 
le passé. La valeur légale de telles ententes varie toutefois d’une juridiction à l’autre 
(par exemple entre l’Ontario, le Manitoba et l’Alberta, leur protection légale n’est pas 
la même).
Enfin et surtout il semble bien que l’étendue de tels accords de reconnaissance volontaire 
aille bien au-delà de cette question. L’ACÉ suggère que les employeurs peuvent obtenir 
des concessions importantes en retour de la reconnaissance volontaire du syndicat.
La conclusion de cette étude est à l’effet que la signature de tels accords de neutralité 
donne un second souffle à l’histoire du volontarisme industriel au Canada. Dans 
l’ensemble, l’expérience canadienne suggère que la prévalence de tels accords, de 
même que la vigueur du volontarisme, sont fortement liées à l’efficacité perçue des 
processus institutionnels d’accréditation existants. Certainement le volontarisme est sur 
une lancée qui ne peut que prendre de la vigueur.
MOTS CLÉS : reconnaissance syndicale, histoire des relations industrielles, accord-cadre 
d’équité
RESuMEn
Voluntarismo industrial en Canadá
La palabra “voluntarismo industrial” ha sido usado para describir la norma que dominó 
la organización sindical y, de manera más amplia, las relaciones sindical- patronales 
en Canadá durante la mayor parte de la primera mitad del siglo XX (Fudge y Tucker, 
2001). En términos prácticos, el principio define situaciones en que los sindicatos y 
empleadores inician, desarrollan y refuerzan acuerdos sin ayuda ni imposición estatal 
(Flanders, 1970). Este documento investiga la historia del voluntarismo en Canadá 
con una atención particular a las acomodaciones legales de la post-guerra y a varias 
manifestaciones del voluntarismo respecto al reconocimiento sindical. Se muestra cómo 
los aspectos del Framework of Fairness Agreement (FFA – Marco de Acuerdo de Equidad) 
negociado entre Magna International y el Canadian Auto Workers (CAW – sindicato de 
trabajadores automotrices) en 2007 se basan en el voluntarismo industrial. El FFA facilita 
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el reconocimiento voluntario de los sindicatos locales del CAW en las fábricas Magna 
en intercambio de la promesa de realizar huelga y de aceptar muchas características 
del sistema de gestión de recursos humanos existente en Magna. De manera general, 
las evidencias históricas y contemporáneas muestran que el voluntarismo continúa a 
manifestar diferentes formas en respuesta a las condiciones cambiantes de las relaciones 
laborales.
PALABRAS CLAVES: reconocimiento sindical, historia de relaciones laborales, estructura de 
acuerdo de equidad
